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REX CLOWARD and RUBIN ThicDOUGAL, djbja The Frostop,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable
A. H. Ellet, Judge.
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MARK S.
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816 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Boston Building
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

P..\ FL HILL, by and through his
guardian ad litem, JAMES L. HILL,
Plalmtiff-Appellant,

vs.
Hl·~X

Case No.
9687

CLO\\rARD and RUBIN Mc-

DOUGAL, djbja The Frostop,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT''S BRIEF

STATE~IENT

OF ·THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action to recover damages for personal
injury.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
..:-\ jury in the Third Judicial District Court brought
in a verdict of no cause of action, based upon a special
verdict in the court of the Honorable A. H. Ellet. A
motion for a new trial was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a new trial.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Paul Hill, an eleven year old minor,
was injured on August 8, 1961, when he fell from an ice
cream truck being driven by one of the defendants, Rex
Cloward, a seventeen year old minor, the plaintiff receiving among other injuries, a broken clavicle. The
defendant Rex Cloward was acting as the agent and employee of the other defendant, Rubin McDougal, who
owned the business and the truck. (R. 60 ~14) The ice
cream truck that was being driven by the defendant Rex
Cloward was a three quarter ton truck with large mirrors
on both sides, and played simple tunes to attract children
and to induce them to purchase ice cream. (R. 17, 18) The
truck had a foot long running board not Inore than twenty inches from the drivers position in the front of the
truc:k. (R. 80) On that date, the plaintiff and another boy
were in front of the plaintiff's house at 4309 \Yest 5500
South, J(earns, Utah. The defendant Rex Cloward drove
up in front of the house with the truck, playing the said
tunes. The two boys approached the truck and asked for
free crushed ice cream cones. At this point the facts are
in dispute. It was the plaintiff's contention that the plaintiff Paul Hill was standing on the running board of the.
true:k when the defendant Rex Cloward, being irritated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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b~· the boy's request for free cones or as a matter of
adolescent impulsiveness, suddenly took off and stopped
briefly at a stop sign at 4420 West 5500 South; that
plaintiff Paul Hill asked Cloward to let him off or he
would tell his father but that Cloward accelerated the
car, and the boy fell off the truck (R. 55). It was the
defendant's contention that the plaintiff had actually
gotten onto the back of the truck out of the vision of the
driver; that the driver was only aware of his presence
through the plaintiff's statements to him from the back
of the truck; that the driver Rex Cloward stopped at the
stop sign to let him ·off; that he thought the plaintiff had
gotten off the truck and was unaware of his fall from
the truck until later on in the day (R. 75, et seq.).

The court then submitted a special verdict to the
jury and on the basis of their answers to the special
verdict, directed a no cause of action judgment against
the plaintiff. (R. 100) The plaintiff then moved for a
new trial which was denied (R. 109), from which the
plaintiff now appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE

DEFENDANT'S REMARKS

CONCERNING HIS

LACK OF INSURANCE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
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During the interrogation by the Court of defendant
Rubin McDougal, the owner of the business and truck
in question, made' the following statements (R. 15, 16) :
"Court: Why don't you bring the truck up
and let us look at it~ Can it be brought up~
A. I haven't any insurance or license on it.
I have the truck, yes.
·Court : We can take care of your license,
bring it up and le·t us look at it, will it run~
A. Certainly it will run. I have no insurance
on it at the· present time.
Mr. Strong: vVill you bring it

up~

A. Surely, if someone wants to put the insurance on it and take the responsibility."
·The remainder of that portion of the interrogation
concerns the immunity of J\1:cDougal from arrest for
driving the truck to the courthouse without a license on

it.
It should be clearly apparent from this portion of
the record and the testimony of the witness that it "·as
the intention of the defendant :McDougal to convey the
impression to the jury that his car was not insured at the
time of the accident. It is common knowledge in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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State of Utah that in the event of a motor vehicle accid('nt, if the owner is not insured, he either has to post a
bond or his license plates are taken away from him.
Also, the accident occurred on August 8, 1961, at which
ti1ne the defendant had license plates. The trial was held
on February 19, 1962, at which time the defendant's
license plates should have still been in good standing.
There can be no other interpretation that can be derived
from this statement of the defendant. It should also be
noted that this testimony was brought out upon interrogation by the Court. It had no purpose to be mentioned
except for the reason we have previously alluded to.
There are· three factors involved here :

1. T'his statement was not elicited by either counsel, but by t'he eourt.
2. It was a voluntary declaration by the defendant having little, if any, referenre to the
question of the court.
3. It was a statement made regarding the lack
of insurance by the defendant himself.
The cases on the issue of where insuranee is mentioned in a personal injury case involving motor vehicles
are multitudinous and many and have been subject to
review by many courts. It is apparent from a survey of
the cases that the whole subject of mentioning insurance
in a negligenre ra~e is surrounded with taboo. shibboleth,
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and ceremony, which was designed primarily to protect
the defendant from excessive verdicts in favor of the
plaintiff. See Trial and Tort Trends Through 1954, PreConvention Semina-r, Mternoon Session, August 29, 1954,
"The Forbidden Word'', By Payne H. Ratner, Wichita,
Kansas, p. 138.
In the case at hand, however, involves the opposite
of the issue, and that is where the defendant himself
states that he has no insurance. This too is designed and
calculated to sway and influence the mind of the jury in
the opposite direction. The end result of such statements
would result in an insufficient verdict for the plaintiff,
or, as in the instant case, a verdict of no cause of action
against the plaintiff.
In the general annotation in A. L. R. on the subjection, 4 A. L. R. 2d 761, ''Admissibility of evidence and
propriety and effect of questions, statements, comments,
etc., tending to show that defendant in personal injury or
death action carries liability insurance", at P. 773, Section 4: "Evidence that defendant is not insured, or only
partly insured.''
'' vVhere nothing has been done or said from
which the jury nught infer that the defendant
is protected by liability insurance it is improper
for defendant to show that he does not have insurance protection, Socony Y acuum Oil Co. v.
:Marvin (1946) 313 J\fich. 528, 21 N\Y 2d 841;
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Brown v. :Murphy Transfer & Storage Co. (1933)
190 ~[inn 81, 251 NW 5; Clayton v. Wells (1930)
3241\Io 1176, 26 SW 2d 969; Piechuck v. Magusiak
(19~6) 82 NH 429, 135 A 534; Davis v. Underdahl
( 1932) 1-t:O Or 2-12, 13 P2d 362 : Cosgrove v. Tracey
( 1937) 156 Or 1, 64 P2d 1321.
"Indeed in at least one case it has been held
proper to exclude evidence that defendant is not
insured although there is already in the case evidence from which it may be inferred that he is
insured", citing Avent v. Tucker (1940) 188 Miss
207, 194 So 596.
The latest pronouncement that we could find on the
subject con1es frmn Graham v. Wriston, Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, (1961), 120 S. E. 2d 713, at
P. 713, quoting from the syllabus:
"9 . . New Trial Closing argument that jurors
were in position of having a blank check with defendant's name signed on it, implied that defendant was not insured and especially since counsel
making such argument knew that defendant was
in fact insured, it was not an abuse of discretion
to set aside verdict for defendant and grant new
trial because of such argument; notwithstanding
fact that state trooper had testified at trial he
had made pictures available to insurance company
and defendant's counsel had such pictures.''
and at p. 720, the Court quotes from Haid v. Loderstedt, -15 vl.J. Super. 5-t-7, 133 A. 2d 655, 657, as follows:
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'' 'It seems to us that the prejudice- suffered
ordinarily by a plaintiff through the improper
revelation of absence of insurance coverage by
the defendant is likely to be even greater than
when the disclosure of such protection of the defendant is injected by the plaintiff. Certainly it
cannot be said to he less hurtful. But more than
this, the act of conveying t'he information to the
jury by a defendant is more deserving of condemnation when the action knows that the implied fact
is untrue. And so the- inclination of a court to find
prejudicial error in such a situation is more
readily stimulated.'
'It is true that the plaintiffs did not ask for
a mistrial when the objection to counsel's remark
was sustained. Nor did the trial judge instruct
the jury to disregard the statement. However, we
think the transgression of the ordinary rules of
fair play was so flagrant that on the basis of plain
error another day in court should be given to the
probable victims of their adversary's disingenuousness.'''
It would appear that if the courts have chosen to
build a 'high wall of taboo around the mention of the
word ''insurance" by the plaintiff, in view of the general
knowledge of juries that the defendant is usually insured (See The Forbidden Word, Ratner, supra, at P.
141: General Knowledge of Insurance), it would seem
more appropriate to build even a higher wall of taboo
around the mention of the forbidden word by the defendant.
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POINT II
THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN GIVING AN
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION DETRIMENTAL TO PLAINTIFF AFTER ARGUMENT BY COUNSEL CONSTITUTED
REVERSIBLE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

In the present case, after instructions had been given
and the case being fully argued to the jury, the trial court
proceeded as follows: (R. 90)
"THE COPRT: Gentlemen, I am going to give
you one more instruction. I am going to insert it.
It will be - let's see. It will be No. 14-A. and
will read thus :''
"No. 14-A. No person shall ride, and no person
driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly permit
any person to ride, upon any portion of any
vehicle not designed nor intended for the use of
passengers. In this case it is undisputed that the
plaintiff was riding on the vehicle at -a place
neither designed nor intended for the use of
passengers. If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, considering his age, intelligence and experience, knew
or in the exercise of due care should have known
that it was dangerous to ride or attempt to ride
on the vehicle in the manner in which he was
attempting to do, then and in that event, you are
instn1eted that the plaintiff was negligent."
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Plaintiff took a proper exception to this instruction
(R. 96).
It would appear that the giving of this instruction
after seemingly all of the instructions were given, and
after argument to the jury by counsel, would not only
deprive plaintiff's counsel from the right to review the
instructions \Vith the trial court and other counsel, but
hy giving special emphasis to this instruction, would
amount to in effect a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant. In 3 Am Jttr 639, Appeal and Error, Section
1121, Time of Giving, it is stated :
"It is not per se prejudicial error that instructions are given to the jury after the argument, in
disregard of the statute, but if injury results by
giving an instruction at the wrong time, it is reversible error.''
"One must show injury in order to secure a reversal for a breach of a rule of court requiring
instructions to be settled between the court and
~ounsel before argument to the jury begins.", citing 2 ALR 1-Hl~. Shelrlon. r. Jnmes 175 Cal. 474,
166. P. ~That the errors we have listed under the two points
that "re urge for reasons for reversal did indeed prejudire the jury is apparent from an examination of the
rerord. It should be recalled that it was the plaintiff's
C'ontention that after the plaintiff mounted the runninp:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
board of the truck, he· was in fact practically the' captive
of an adolescent driver. Question No. One of the Special
YPrdict reads as follows (R. 103) :

·'Question 1 : After leaving the stop sign, did Rex
Cloward know or in the exercise of re'asonable care
should have :known that Paul Hill was still on the truck'?

Answer No." In response to questions by his own counsel, the defendant Paul Hill states as follows (R. 84)
sel, the defendant Rex Cloward states as follows (R 84)
"Q. Now, as you started up, did you think
he was on the truck~
A. No. I thought he would have sense
enough to get off.
off~

Q.

Well, did you think he had got

A.

I ttcasn't sure." (emphasis ours)

Then on R. 85, line 22, during the' same period of
questioning, the testimony proceeds as follows :
''Q.
or

What is the next thing that you heard

saw~

A. X ext thing I heard was he yelled." (emphasis ours)
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At whioh point counsel for defendant attempts to
correct this by a leading question.
"Q.
A.

You heard a yell?
Yes."

See also page 86 of the Record, wherein the defendant Rex Cloward testifies that he saw a boy lying in the
middle of the road, but made not attempt to stop or
investigate·. 'The fact that he did not go back to give aid
is indicative of guilt as to the wilfulness of his conduct,
and his knowledge of the fact that the boy was still on
the truck.
Finally, the prejudicial attitude of the jury is indicated by the answer to Que'Stion No. Five of the Special
\'" erdirt. whieh reads as follows (R. 105):
"Question 5 : As shown by a preponderance of the
evidence in this case, what amount of money would fairly and adequately recompense Paul Hill for any and all
damage and injury lw sustained as a result of his fall
from t'hP ice crPam

truck~

Answer $100.00"

Yet the medical testimony indicates that the boy
suffered a broken clavicle and that the special damages
themselves WPTP $R2.50. whi(>h ·wonld }pave dan1ag-es for
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pain and suffering assessed in the amount of $17.50. Can
it be denied that the two facts mentioned had indeed prejudiced the minds of the

jury~

CONCLUSION
To conclude, we submit that it is one of the primary
functions of an appellate court in negligence cases to
ascertain if each of the litigants has been given a fair
trial and has had indeed "his day in court". We further
submit that because of the prejudicial nature of the two
errors we have raised on appeal, the plaintiff has not
had his day in court. It is of particular importance that
the fact of the lack of insurance coverage by the defendant be invested with the same, if not greater, protection
than the disclosure of he fact that the defendant is insured. We therefore respectfully request that the judgment be reversed that the plaintiff be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN E. STONE
MARK S. MINER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
816 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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